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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.
l 0871

DARWIN OLSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The appellant was convicted of Second Degree
Burglary in violation of 76-9-3 UCA 1953, in the
First Judicial District Court, Cache County, and
appeals from the conviction. Case was heard November 29, 1966, the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson, Sixth
Judicial District, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried on November 29, 1966,
on the crime of Second Degree Burglary. The case
was tried to the court without a jury, the Honorable
Ferdinand Erickson presiding. Defendant and appellant was found guilty, and judgment entered thereon on
the 4th day of January, 1967.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appe 1 l ant he rein seeks a reversal of the j udg. ~~
ment of the lower court as a matter of law and a
.
1 f
h·
At
d .1sm1ssa
o t 1s action by this Court; or, failing Di
that, that the defendant and appellant herein be
a~
grante d a new trial to be heard without prejudicial (l
error to the appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1'
In the late evening hours of March 3, 1966, or
5
the early morning hours of March 4, 1966, the Hyrum p
Drug Store located at 60 West Main Street, Hyrum,
a
Utah, was entered and a quantity of narcotics were
t
taken from the store (T 8, 13). At approximately
4
6:15 A.M., of the 4th day of March, 1966, an auto1
mobile was observed by Iver L. Larsen on First North
Street, Hyrum, Utah, behind the Hyrum Drug Store.
Mr. Larsen noted the 1 icense number of the car and
observed a man sitting by himself in the automobile.
(T 42-46). About three hours later the burglary was
discovered by the store owner and reported to Sheriff
Wesley G. Malmberg, Sheriff of Cache County. Mr.
Larsen then gave to Sheriff Malmberg the information
concerning the 1 icense plate and description of the I
car he observed.
(T 4 3) . The 1 i cense number be 1on gel
to a car registered to Mr. E. G. Hunt of South Ogden,
Utah.
(T 107).

Sheriff Malmberg went to the home of Mr. E. G. '
Hunt, where he found Mr. Dennis Hunt. Mr. Dennis
Hunt after questioning, delivered to Sheriff Malmberg\
a crowbar, designated as Ex. 1, together with a
j
quantity of drugs and bottles, designated as Ex. 3 - I
11) (T. 107, 1 08, 122) • This evidence of the burg1 ary which was received by Sheriff Malmberg was all
the physical evidence submitted to the trial cou~t.
Al 1 physical evidence connecting the appellant with
the burglary in any fashion was delivered to the
Sheriff by Mr. Dennis Hunt.
(T 123, 124).

3

At the time of tria1 the State's witnesses includ ,d Mr. Dennis Hunt and Miss Mary Jones both of
lg. wh0'11 had previous 1y been told by the Cache' County
Attorney and the District Attorney for the First
ng District that if they would testify against the
appellant they wou1d not be prosecuted by the State.
al (T 96).
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According to the testimony of Dennis Hunt and
Mary Jones, they went to Logan, Utah, on March 3,
1966, and contacted the appellant (T 51). After
spending so~etime with the a?pe1lant a group of five
people, including Mr. Hunt, Miss Jones, and the
appellant, drove to Pocatello, Idaho, (T 53) where
they remained unti1 the early morning hours of March
4, 1966, and then returned to Logan, Utah, (T 53).
They went to a cafe in Logan, (T 53). They then,
according to Mr. Hunt's testimony, drove to the
a?pel1ant 1 s home where a crowbar was obtained. (T 54).
They, Mr. Hunt, Miss Jones, Mr. Nielson, and Appellant, then drove to Mr. Nielson's car, in Mr. Hunt's
car. (T 55). The two auto~obiles were then driven
to the Town of Hyrum, Utah. (T 55). Mr. Hunt, Miss
Jones, Mr. Nie1son and the appe11ant got into Mr.
Hunt's car and drove around the Hyrum area for so.~e
period of time. (T 55, 57). Mr. Nie1so'1 and the
appe11ant a11eged1y 1eft the Hunt car with a crowbar
a'1d a bag, wh i 1e the car was parked on the street
behind the Hyrum Drug Store. (T 58, 60). Miss Jones
stated that she and Mr. Hunt waited for awhile, then
drove around the town of Hyrum for a period of time
and then returned to park near the store. (T 130).
She a1so testified that she heard scraping and
screeching noises coming from the direction of the
store, and that a short time later Mr. Nie1son and
the appe11ant returned to the car. Miss Jones then
opened the car door for them. (T 158).
Miss Jones testified that there was discussion
in her presence as to the fact that a 11 job 11 or un1awful break-in was going to take place. She said, however, that she did not know where unti1 they had
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and the appellant. Mr. Hunt dropped Mr. Nielson
and the appellant off at Mr. Nielson's car, and
after the group separated they reconvened at Miss
Jones' apartment in Ogden, Utah. While driving to
Ogden with Miss Jones, Mr. Hunt once again made no co
effort to notify the pol ice. He spent twenty-four
hours at Miss Jones' apartment where al 1 four used
the stolen drugs. After returning to his parents 1 st
home some thirty hours after the burglary, Mro Hunt Mi
was informed that the Cache County Sheri ff was look- he
ing for him. Then, and only then did he cal 1 the
tr
authorities.

At the time of trial, Mr. Hunt said he was an
bL
informer for the F. B. I . attempting to 1ocate stolen n<
cars. The general law provides that an informer
who has no intent to commit a crime is not an accom· a~
pl ice. Shepherd v. U.S. (1908 CCA 8th) 160 F 584, cE
cert. denied 212 U. S. 571. However a person is an .)L
L
accomplice unless his~ intent (emphasis added)
when he participates in the act is to secure the
apprehension of the other participants. Under no
circumstances may he intend to share in the proceeds al
of the burglary. Wi Ison v. People, 103 Colo. 44;
p<
87 p 2d 5.
t(

IC

II
Where the evidence is not clear it is for the
d
trier of the fact to determine whether a witness is
a real or feigned accomplice within the general
doctrine stated above. People v. Bunker (1905)
q
2 Cal App 197, 84 P 36, Porter v. People, 31 Colo
508, 74 P 879, State v. Smith, 33 Nev 438, 117 P 19, d
p
In this case the trial court did not rule as to
c
whether the witness Mr. Hunt, was or was not an
accomplice whose testimony would require corroboration. The record clearly indicates that Mr. Hunt
by his own testimony was an accomplice because of
a
his participation not only in the planning of the
burglary but in the execution thereof, together with b
his taking the fruits of the crime for his own use
and benefit.
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PO INT 11.
STATE'S WITNESS MARY JONES IS AN ACCOMPLICE, AS

A MATTER OF LAW AND FACT, WHOSE TESTIMONY REQUIRES

cORROBORAT I ON.

Mary Jones, witness for the State, was in conitant association with the appel I ant, Dennis Hunt and
t Mike Nielson for a period of approximately fifteen
k· hours prior to the alleged burglary and thirty hours
thereafter.
(R-125, 159).

1.

5

By her own testimony she knew of the plan to
burglarize a drug store, (T 154 L 18-26) and that
narcotic pi 1 ls were the intended object of the crime.
She waited while the burglary took place, and encouraged the crime by her presence and apparent acquiescence. She acted as a lookout, picked up the alleged
)urg 1ars, and even opened the door of the car to
facilitate their get-away.
The conduct of Miss Jones is sufficiently culpable to have successfully prosecuted her as a principal, since she had knowledge that a crime was going
to be committed; knew what was going to be burglarized;
acted as a lookout during the al Jeged crime; ·assisted
in the parties' fleeing from the scene, and used the
drugs taken in the a1 leged crime, at her apartment.
There are numerous cases which hold that the
question of whether a person is an accomplice is
determined by the evidence showing the accomplice's
participation in a crime.
Illustrative of these
cases a re:
People v. Swoape, (1925) 75 Cal. App. 404, 242 P
In this case the State's witness was held to be
accomplice on his testimony that he knew the pipe was
being stolen and assisted in loading it on the truck
that carried it away.

1067.
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Commonwealth v. Coyle, 203 A. 2d 782 (1964),
In this case the defendant, John Coy 1e, was convi c·
ted by a jury of first degree murder. The facts as
established by the evidence incident to the killing
showed that defendant and his brother Wi 11 i am armed
themselves with revolvers and went out in a Phi lade].
phia neighborhood to steal milk before dawn on Ju~
5, 1959. While John was standing watch, Wi 11 iam was
steal i ng mi l k from a front porch when pol ice off i ceri
caughi him in the act. Shots were fired and the
pol ice officer fell dead. Although the evidence was
in conflict as to who was the actual killer, the
trial court held and Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed that both we re equa 1 l y gu i 1ty; and John, even
if he did not fire the fatal shots, was a principal
in the second degree and was subject to the same
punishment as if he were the principal felon.
At page 786, quoting from Commonwealth v. Lowry.
98 A 2d 773 (1953) and Weston v. Commonweal th, 2 A
191 (1885), the court said:
lt is not necessary, however, to prove
that the party actually aided in the commission of the offense; if he watched for his
companions, in order to prevent surprise,
or remained at a convenient distance in order
to favor their escape, if necessary, or was
in such a situation as to be able readily to
come to their assistance, the knowledge of
whi~h was calculated to give additional confidence to his companions in contemplation
of 1aw , he was a i d i n g and ab e tt i n g • r 1
11

People v. Ortiz, 25 Cal Rptr 327 (1962) •. Here
defendant was convicted of possession of heroin although the direct evidence showed that his wife,
rather than he, was in actual possession of the drug
at the time of arrest.
Affirming the trial court's conviction, the
California District Court of Appeal said at Page 333:

9

110 new ho .1s present and is aware of the
acts of the perpetrator of the crime and
either by acts or encouragement or warning
or by gestures aids or encourages the commission of the crime is an aider and abettor and
may be charged as a principal ,11
People v. Marx, 125 N.E. 719 (1920), where defendant was convicted of rape, and on appea 1 it was
argued, among other things, that he was not guilty
since he had not had sexual intercourse with the
prosecutrix or taken any active part with others who
had intercourse. In affirming the conviction the
11 l inois Supreme Court said at page 722:
Notw i ths tand i ng these rules as to non1 iabi l ity of a passive spectator, it is certain that proof that a person is present at
the commission of a crime without disapproving or opposing it is evidence from which rn
connection with other circumstances it is
competent for the jury to infer that he
assented thereto, lent to it his countenance
and approval, and was thereby aiding and
abetting the same. 11
11

Cotton v. State, 211 N.E. 2d 158 (1965), In
this case the defendant was convicted of grand larceny and burglary by Marion County Criminal Court,
The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the conviction,
Citing Mobley v. State, 85 N,E, 2d 489 (1949)
and Mattingly v. State, 104 N.E. 2d 721 (1952) the
court said at page 161:
riEven if there were no active participation in the commission of the crime failure
to oppose it at the time, companionship with
others engaged therein, and a course of conduct before and after the offense are such
circumstances as may be considered in determining whether aiding or abetting may be inferred.11
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The 1aw does not make a bystander or spectator
to a criminal act a participant if he is only a
spectator and does not act to countenance or appr~
those who are actors. Hicks v. U.S., 150 u. s. e
442, 376 Ed. 1137, 14 S. Ct. 144. However, a per·
son ceases to be a bystander or spectator when he
encourages its commission by acts, or gestures,
either before or at the time of the commission of
the offense, with full knowledge of the intent of
the persons who commit the offense. Peop 1e v. Mar.:i_
Supra, 722.
The question to be determined in ascertaining
whether a person is in a position to aid and abet
in the comm is s ion of an offense is not so much where
he may happen to be, as whether he is in a position
to render aid and encouragement to the actual perpetrator, with a view of insuring the success of the
common purpose. Cavert v. State, 158 Tenn. 531, 14
s .w. 2d 735.
A principal has been defined to include a per·
son who was present at the time a crime was committee
1ending countenance, aid, or encouragement, or keep·
ing watch at some convenient distance while anoth~r
did the actual criminal act. Dooley v. Coleman,
126 Fla. 203, 170 So. 722.
Thus Mary Jones by her conduct both overt and
tacitly became in fact and as a matter of law, an
accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated.
PO INT

111

THAT THE STATE'S WITNESSES MARY JONES AND DENNIS
HUNT WERE IN FACT AND IN LAW ACCOMPLICES AND THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO CORROBORATE THEIR
TESTIMONY.
The Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-31-18 pro·
vides as follows:

11
"Conviction on Testimony of Accomplice A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself
and without the aid of the testimony of the
accomplice tends to connect the defendant
with the commission of the offense; and the
corroboration shall not be sufficient, if
it merely shows the commission of the offense
or the circumstances thereof. 11
The testimony of State's witness Dennis Hunt
and Mary Jones is uncorroborated. Thus, since there
is no other evidence which connects appellant with
the burglary, the conviction should be set aside.
Moreover, State's witness, Sheriff Malmberg, testified that he had no evidence other than the uncorroborated testimony of Dennis Hunt and Mary Jones.
(T 123, T l 24) .
In the case of State v. Laris, 2 P 2d, 243,
(1931), the Utah Supreme Court set down a test for
the sufficiency of the corroborated evidence, citing State v. Cox, 277 P 972; State v. Butterfield,
261 P 804; State v. Lay, 110 P 986, and State v.
Spencer, 49 P 302.
At page 246 the Court said:
·~ * * the test for sufficiency of the
corroborated evidence is that it need not
be sufficient in itself to sustain a conviction but it must in and of itself tend
to implicate and connect the accused with
the commission of the crime charged, and
not be consistant with his innocence. It
is insufficient if it merely casts a grave
suspicion on the accused.rr

12
Also cited with approval in the Laris case
----..:..::.•
supra, at page 246, is another test suggested in
Weldon v. State, 10 Tex. App. 400, which reads as
fol lows:
"Eliminate from the case the evidence of
the accomplice and then examine the evidence
of the other witnesses or witness with the
view to ascertain if there be inculpatory
evidence - evidence tending to connect the
defendant with the offense. If there is,
the accomplice is corroborated; if there
is no inculpatory evidence, there is not
corrobor~tion, though the accomplice may be
corroborated in regard to any number of facts
shown to be him. 11
See also State v. Lay, I JO P 986, where the
court held that section 77-31-18 precludes conviction of a defendant upon uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice even though the jury believes his
testimony to be true as to every material fact and
are convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The court
case, supra in
~in holding
uncorroborated

reaffirmed its position of the~
State v. Lane, 3 U 2d 23, 277 P 2d
that no conviction may be had upon
testimony of an accomplice.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the record of the trial together
with the applicable Jaw upon the points raised in

13
this appeal the conviction of the appellant should
be reversed and the case dismissed,

Respectfully submitted,
DALEE, STRATFORD
JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON
Attorneys for Appellant
2640 Washington Blvd,
Ogden, Utah

